INTRODUCTION
Federal statutes imposing liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs raise numerous issues directly affecting the personal liability of directors and officers ("D&Os"). The most important issues of concern to D&Os are liability and funding. The liability issue deals with who will bear the cleanup costs; the funding issue deals with how those costs will be financed. Courts have resolved the liability issue with the apparently simple rule that under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 1 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 2 "the 'polluter pays.,'" The issue of funding, on the other hand, has not been so easily resolved; determining how costs are to be financed often balances on how a court interprets the coverage provided by an insurance contract. as establishing a strict liability scheme"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) ; id. at 171 (noting that "[w]hile CERCLA does not mandate the imposition ofjoint and several liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible harm"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that CERCLA imposes retroactive liability), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) ; see also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 74 (1985) , reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 (stating congressional support for a uniform federal rule of joint and several liability under CERCLA).
(241) the production, distribution, and consumption cycle, including the discovery, recovery, processing, and transportation of raw materials, the fabrication and assembly of finished products, and the consumption and disposal of those products. 7 Hazardous wastes can be generated as by-products of manufacturing, 8 released from corporate equipment (such as factory machinery), 9 and even absorbed into the soil of property acquired for investment by a corporation. 1 0 Because waste is so pervasive in industrial activity, businesses without some nexus to any hazardous waste site are the exception. Second, hazardous waste is an unintentional by-product of business enterprise. 11 See STURDIVANT, supra note 6, at 313. day standards, may later engender a long-term hazard to the environment, 12 resulting in long-term liability for those individuals involved in its release. Even a company that performs the most current risk analyses and invests in monitoring costs and state of the art safety precautions cannot shield itself from liability if contamination occurs, or has occurred, due to former practices. 13 Third, the social costs of pollution are not necessarily absorbed by those who enjoy the social benefit of the good producing the hazardous waste by-products. 14 Therefore, without regulatory or market action, risk-creating activities are not internalized by commercial enterprises. 15 In CERCLA suits, courts have held that common law principles of limited liability for D&Os, traditionally provided by the corporate structure, 1 6 are not applicable. 17 This loss of common law protection for business decisions is further compounded by judicial interpretations of D&O liability insurance coverage. Unable to deny D&O personal liability because of "the polluter pays" premise, the same courts have also found that D&O liability insurance does not cover insureds' environmental decisions. Indeed, even where the 12 See CERCLA, § 104(i)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)(B) (1988) courts read general liability coverage into D&O liability insurance agreements, their means of finding coverage forebode an unstable body of state common law. Two problems result from these judicial interpretations: first, conventional insurance actuarial techniques in premium setting become inapplicable, 18 and second, because of the lack of tenable legal standards to guide decisions, corporate D&Os engage in risk-averse decision making. 19 This Comment traces the development of individual D&O liability and analyzes the public and private sectors' reactions to increased individual liability. Part I of this Comment focuses on sources of liability for environmental decisions, including evolving notions of limited liability under the common law. In reviewing the reasons for common law protection in other areas, the appropriateness of common law limited liability protection for environmental decisions will also be considered. Part I concludes that standards, similar to business judgment rule standards, are warranted for environmental decisions.
If the courts will not provide common law standards to protect the decisions of D&Os in the environmental context, political and market alternatives must be provided. Part II considers the political alternatives to common law protection. State statutory responses, especially in light of their interaction with a federal statute such as CERCLA, will be considered, and the effects of limited liability statutes and the flaws of indemnification statutes will be shown. Part II concludes that state statutory responses to the lack of common law protection are desirable but may not be effective.
Part III analyzes D&O liability insurance as the market alternative to statutory and common law protection. 19 This problem is twofold: the lack of legal standards blurs the threshold of liability, making corporate D&Os more vulnerable to personal liability, while increased claim susceptibility causes the D&O insurance market to respond by restricting coverage availability and increasing coverage costs.
The insurance market's reaction is seen in three separate changes in the availability of coverage: increases in deductible and coinsurance levels, lower aggregate policy limits, and expansion of coverage exclusions. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1571 (1987). See generally id. at 1571-76 (discussing how increasing legal risks generated by changes in tort law results in the flight of low-risk insureds from the insurance market, reducing the general availability of affordable insurance).
insurance in protecting D&Os from personal liability under CERCLA will be considered in light ofjudicial construction of D&O liability insurance coverage. In conclusion, part III suggests that even though the environmental risks associated with GEROLA liability may be insurable, the unstable body of law surrounding both D&O personal liability and the coverage provided by D&O liability insurance are too uncertain for conventional underwriting methods. Without legislative intervention or significant judicial rethinking of the role of insurance and its ability to protect potentially liable D&Os, insurance will not continue to be an effective alternative to the lack of public sector protection. CERCLA's absolute liability scheme provides no incentive for insurers to monitor the decision-making process, for if environmental liability is truly fundamental to the business management process, D&O environmental liability will be uninsurable.
I. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Even though CERCLA is the basis for general liability for environmental hazards, it is the federal courts that have created the "evolving principles of federal common law" which impose strict, joint and several, and retroactive personal liability on responsible individuals. 20 These evolving principles of federal common law conflict with state common law limitations on corporate liability. The traditional common law doctrine of limited liability provides that the corporate entity is usually liable for violations of statutes rather than those officers, directors, and shareholders who make up the corporate entity.
1
This common law doctrine of limited liability reflects the uncertainty and risk-taking implicated in every business decision:
Businessmen make business decisions. They are not courts, able and willing to pursue a matter to the last argument in the search of the "right" answer. They are not researchers meticulously seeking truth. They are not scientists striving for ever more refined solutions in a field of narrow specialization.... The decisions the businessman must make are fraught with risk, and he is quite accustomed to making these decisions in a hurry on the basis of a hunch and manifestly sparse data. The businessman and the board of directors thrive or die in a sea of uncertainty. 43 If the key term is "any person," making all individuals liable regardless of the corporate shell, then even outside directors are jointly and severally liable for their participation on the board which makes the decision. See CERCLA, § 107 (a)(2)-(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)-(a)(4) (1988); O'Hara, supra note 28, at 6 (stating that the significance of the term "any person" is that it reaches beyond the corporate shell attaching liability to any individual or corporation fitting within the class made potentially liable). If, however, the definition of "owner or operator" is equally important, then broad construction of that phrase may determine that participation in management of a "facility" as an "operator" is not equivalent to participation in management of a corporation as a fiduciary, and without any indicia of ownership the outside director is excluded from liability for his corporate decisions. See CERCLA, § 101(9), (20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), (20)(A) (1988); see also, Lawrence, supra note sizing control or authority, 44 make it unlikely, however, that a court will fail to find an outside director liable for her relationship to business decisions affecting the facility. 45 As was articulated above, courts often read into CERC[A a congressional intention to find corporate D&Os individually liable for their environmental decisions. However, courts must also bypass the common law notions of limited liability protecting management decisions. The courts must, therefore, create common law to justify an imposition of personal liability on D&Os, for they cannot merely rely on the language of CERCLA.
Under traditional common law, even though a corporation may be strictly liable for the consequences of a management decision, the mere holding of corporate office does not in and of itself make the officer personally liable for management decisions. 46 Corporate officers are protected by a "fiduciary shield." 47 This fiduciary shield is not, however, impenetrable. Under a common law "personal participation" theory, a corporate officer can be held directly liable for the corporation's torts. To be held directly liable, the officer must have personally participated in the tortious activity. 48 Under the personal participation theory, an officer is personally liable for any wrongful acts she commits, even those committed on behalf of the corporate employer and within the scope of her duties. 49 This theory has been given liberal effect by 28, at 10,378 (concluding that the broad standard of liability is consistent with CERCLA's purposes and is good policy).
44 See Lawrence, supra note 28, at 10,380-81 (identifying a line of cases finding individual responsibility for day-to-day management and operations to be grounds for liability It is, however, a theory that is based on direct liability for the wrongful act of the officer, and is different from the major concern of CEROLA liability-that personal derivative liability will result from a business decision taken with due care.
Derivative violations of environmental laws, 53 courts are less likely to impose derivative civil liability on corporate officers. 54 Because of the different risks of personal liability between direct and derivative civil liability, a perplexing concern for corporate officers must be whether a decision regarding a corporation's hazardous materials will be evaluated by the EPA and the courts as personal participation in a wrongful act. This uncertainty is compounded by the knowledge that, if they are liable individually, their individual liability will be joint and several with other PRPs for the cleanup costs, even if they used the most conservative decisionmaking process.
55
In addition to the traditional common law theories that support the imposition of personal liability on D&Os, courts can also turn to federal common law. Under the federal common law there are at least two additional approaches that can be used to impose personal liability on D&Os. In the GERCLA context, the most common approach is to "look to the language and purpose of the statute in determining whether Congressional intent favors protection of the corporate form." 56 CERGLA liability decisions applying such an approach are inconsistent with one another; congressional intent has been read both for and against imposing personal liability. 57 A second federal common law approach is a heavily fact-specific "prevention test." This approach was intro- 55 See supra notes 3 & 5.
" O'Hara, supra note 28, at 4-5; see also Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981) (indicating that courts applying federal common law "will look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to determine whether the statute places importance on the corporate form, an inquiry that usually gives less respect to the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine" (citations omitted)). In both cases, the court based its test on a finding that "[a]lthough liability under CERCLA is essentially a strict liability scheme, the case law indicates that where CERCLA seeks to impose liability beyond the corporate form, an individual's power to control the practice and policy of the corporation, and the responsibility undertaken by that individual... should be considered."
6° At the very least, such a test allows corporate D&Os to prove that the practices used and individual precautions taken to prevent the release of hazardous substances meet a threshold standard of care. By meeting such a standard, individual D&Os would avoid joint and several liability with other PRPs for accidental releases of hazardous substances. Such a standard reflects the traditional common law notions underlying the business judgment rule. The prevention test, therefore, reflects the uncertainty involved in many corporate decisions that have potential environmental effects and promotes responsible decision-making.
Nevertheless, more conclusive theories for imposing personal liability on D&Os may be evolving under the federal common law. For instance, a federal common law theory of individual liability called the "central figure" theory has been applied in cases dealing with violations of domestic fuel price controls. 61 Under this theory, the person who played the "central role" in corporate wrongdoing is fully liable. The question of whether the defendant played a central role is based on a fact-specific analysis of her role and actions. 62 According to the central role theory, the defendant may be held liable even if she did not participate in the actual commission of the tort. 
B. Establishing a Standard of Care For Environmental Decisions
In the corporate context, D&Os owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders of their corporation. That duty consists of a duty of loyalty and a duty of reasonable care. 63 If D&Os breach that duty, they are susceptible to shareholder suits.6 Should such a suit arise, D&Os, in defending their actions as fiduciaries, can rely on the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule protects D&Os from liability for corporate losses caused by honest mistakes of judgment; it presumes that D&Os have complied with their fiduciary duties. 6 5 Even where that presumption is contested, D&Os are protected from judicial second-guessing of their business decisions if such decisions are made while exercising due (or ordinary) care, acting in good faith, and having a reasonable belief that the actions are in the corporation's best interest. 66 The rule is an efficient one. Based on the theory that some risk-taking is desirable in maximizing corporate profitability, 67 the business judgment rule reduces disincentives for good faith risk-taking by limiting D&Os' liability.
Although the business judgment rule protects D&Os from judicial second-guessing when defending against shareholder suits, similar protection may not be available for environmental decisions resulting in potential CERCLA liability. 68 First, the rule is only applicable when the cause of action is based on the breach of a fiduciary duty 6 9 and when D&Os act lawfully. 70 Essentially, there are four major types of environmental contingencies that may require disclosure: (1) if compliance with "command and control" environmental law requirements (such as installation of pollution control equipment) may have a material effect on a registrant; (2) if initiation or potential initiation of toxic tort litigation is likely to have a material effect; (3) if past corporate environmental practices by the registrant make it reasonably likely that remediation for those practices is necessary; and (4) if the registrant is connected with a facility at which cleanup activities may impose potential liability. See Archer et al., supra, at 10,108. Although the SEC has stated that designation as a PRP by the EPA under CERCLA "does not in and of itself trigger disclosure,.., a registrant's particular circumstances, when coupled with PRP status, may provide that knowledge." MD&A Release, supra, at 22,430 n.30.
Thus, negligence in failing to disclose or in improperly disclosing the potential environmental liabilities of the corporation in a registration statement will result in personal civil liability of corporate directors and signing officers under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § § 77f, 77k (1988 Although § 11 is a potential source of personal liability for D&Os, § 11 damages are limited to a maximum recovery equal to the price at which the securities were offered to the public. See Securities Act of 1933, §33, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e), (g) (1988).
These compensatory damages may be minor compared to the potential long-range costs of the underlying environmental damages. They are, nevertheless, a potential liability for the entire board, including the outside directors.
Let us then consider the normal situation of a director who has made a good faith environmental decision, such as deciding to use the best available means for containing and disposing of hazardous wastes. Under the business judgment rule, the director would expect that if the best available means accord with industry standards and GERCLA liability results regardless of those best available means, he will still be protected from shareholder suits. Therefore, although a director is not liable to the corporate shareholders for the corporation's share of the costs, he may have strict personal liability to the government for cleanup costs regardless of the standard of care used by the director. 7 2 Such a result makes sense, for unlike the government, the shareholders have, in theory, assumed the risk that management decisions may result in losses to the corporation. 73 That the director's best-available-means environmental decision is not protected from CERCLA liability by a rule similar to the business judgment rule would not normally be a problem because he is normally protected from derivative liability by common law limited liability standards. 74 Courts, however, have removed limited liability protection by finding individual liability for corporate managers to be a necessary means of accomplishing the congressional intent behind CERCLA. 75 75 Therefore, although the business judgment rule may be of little help to directors in avoiding personal liability to the government for cleanup costs, it is at least of some benefit in defending against shareholder suits that may arise over corporate liability for CERCLA expenses. This protection against shareholder suits is particularly important if D&O liability insurance policy claims are to be a reasonable view of reality: according to a Wyatt Company survey of D&O insurance, shareholders were the single largest source of D&O policy claims. See THE WYATT COMPANY, 1989 WYATr DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 37-38 (1989) There are three possible responses to D&O liability under CERCLA: (1) D&Os can refuse to make decisions entailing personal risk of environmental liability, (2) legislatures can provide additional statutory protection against personal D&O liability, or (3) the market can respond by shifting the risk of personal loss to the beneficiaries of the risk.
The individual response by D&Os will not work if the risk of pollution liability is universal and absolute, and there are strong grounds to believe this is substantially true. The legislative response will work only if it really removes the risk from the individual. State legislatures have a definite interest in protecting corporate decision-makers.
Corporate D&Os will seek to do business in states where their personal interests are best protected. Thus, states must respond by doing all they can to restore confidence, or risk losing qualified corporate managers (or entire corporations) to states providing more favorable treatment of corporate decision-makers. 80 This part addresses the legislative response alternative; the market response alternative is addressed in part III. 
B. State Indemnification Statutes
The statutory limitations on corporate directors' liability, discussed above, exist only in a few states. 94 Most states' corporation laws provide only permissive protection, which allow their corporations-competing in the marketplace for corporate managers-to decide whether or not to provide management with indemnification provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws.
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Additionally, the lack of business judgment rule protection for D&Os from personal liability for CERCLA cleanup costs means D&Os are most likely to be held personally accountable to the federal government in the very area in which they are least likely to enjoy indemnification. Though the benefits D&Os receive may reflect their risks of liability, few individuals can afford the costs of litigation and cleanup associated with CERCLA liability, regardless of salary, compensation, and other prerogatives. In addition, the argument that D&Os should be personally accountable to the government as "operators" of the corporation seems prejudicial against the management role. The corporation is operated for the benefit of the shareholder-owners who enjoy the statutory protection of CERCLA's exclusion of persons holding "indicia of ownership, .... without participating in the management of a facility." permissive under the statute. 99 When interim funding is not specifically mandated in the corporate by-laws, the burden of advancing the costs of litigation and expenses may fall on the individual, who may not be repaid under the indemnity contract until entry of a final favorable ruling.
10 0 This burden treats the individual as a wrongdoer until her acts have been legally vindicated.
The purpose of CERCLA is to ensure compensation of the government and private groups for the cost of hazardous waste cleanup, not to punish decision-makers for past actions that violate current standards.
1 0 1 There is, therefore, no public policy reason for forcing a corporate director or officer to bear the burden of proving that her actions warrant indemnification. D&Os who commit clearly wrongful acts should expect no protection, 10 2 but where liability is strict and retroactive the line between right and wrong is blurred. This lack of a "bright line" standard makes it inequitable to force an individual to bear the burden of defending her good faith/best judgment risks taken for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholder-owners until, through vindication, indemnification is warranted.
The risk of personal liability for corporate D&Os can be partially remedied if, when using good faith and their best judgment in making decisions, D&Os are protected from personal liability for unforeseen or unappreciated risks until the reasonableness of their decisions is disproved. Statutory indemnification does not provide such protection. Individual liability insurance coverage could provide this protection as a market response to the uncertainties of indemnification and the burden of GERCLA interim costs, but for insurance to be an effective market tool, courts must keep the In those states, however, where permissive indemnification is the only protection for D&Os from CERCLA liability, the statutory protection is incomplete.
Incomplete protection means that there is a substantial risk of personal liability for D&Os.
Market measures are therefore necessary to compensate for this lack of protection. Pollution liability insurance is one such market mechanism. 10 4 Liability insurance requires that the insurer provide coverage once a liability has been established; the fact that the insured has not yet suffered any loss is immaterial.
1 05 Liability insurance, therefore, insulates
D&Os from the cost of personally warranting their actions and thus approaches a better remedy than statutory indemnification. D&O liability insurance (either through a commercial carrier or private self-insurance) shifts the burden of risks taken in good faith and using best judgment back to the real beneficiary of the risks, the shareholder-owners. Insurance coverage forces the shareholders to convert potential returns into insurance premium payments. 1 0 6 Shareholders may respond to this shifting of the risk by arguing that the threat of individual liability can be shown to have a very real effect on the decision-maker who is potentially exposed to personal loss,10 7 and by thus shifting the risk of personal loss away from management, standards of managerial conduct will diminish. 0 Nevertheless, when D&Os are acting for the corporation the business judgment rule requirements (which protect against the more real threat of shareholder suits) 1 ' should maintain a minimum standard of management conduct.
B. Judicial Disregard for the Justification Behind D&O Liability Policies
Statutory limitations on liability represent a public policy that D&Os should not be personally liable for corporate acts taken in good faith and using reasonable judgment. 10 D&O liability insurance represents a similar market response to such liability by providing insurance for the risk associated with business decisions that result in personal liability. However, such a market mechanism can be effective only if courts correctly analyze the insurance agreement and the intentions of the parties creating the agreement.
A D&O liability insurance policy comes in two parts. One part provides insurance directly to the individual; the other part provides reimbursement to the corporation for executive indemnification. The individual insurance coverage and the corporate indemnification insurance coverage are always provided by the same D&O liability insurance policy."' Although the overall policy is titled a "liability" policy, there is disagreement as to whether the insurance policy really provides liability insurance. Since the corporation reimbursement part of the policy provides indemnification coverage to the corporation, insurers argue that the entire policy (including the individual insurance part) is an indemnity policy. 112 This argument does not reflect the obvious intent of the D&O insureds in seeking D&O liability insurance for personal liability.
118
The D&O insureds are primarily interested in creating a liability policy that avoids the personal expenses associated with indemnification.
Remembering the problems associated with the common law and state indemnification statutes which justify D&O liability insurance as a supplemental market measure, 1 14 the reason for the bifurcation of D&O liability policies seems plain. As was discussed in part II, indemnification is an imperfect guarantee of personal risk. 115 The corporate indemnification portion of the policy reimburses the insured corporation for this partial protection of D&Os permitted by indemnification statutes. If D&O liability insurance is to be a market response to the partial protection of indemnification, the individual insurance portion of the policy must exist to alleviate the remaining financial burdens associated with indemnification: the costs of litigation and CERCLA response costs incurred prior to a favorable ruling. 112 The insurance carrier prefers that the policy be an indemnity policy, because the burden is then upon the insured to prove the wrongful act is covered by the policy.
pl An important concern for the individual D&Os in performing a personal risk analysis of their decisions is whether their D&O liability policy provides liability or indemnity coverage. See, e.g., Bisceglia, supra note 73, at 691 (discussing the practical effect of the difference between indemnity and liability policies for D&Os). 116 For a discussion of response costs that may be incurred before a favorable ruling, see infra note 139. liability coverage. The first and far more superficial approach is to simply look at the title and the loss provisions of the policy. Such a determination has little support because it disregards the policy as a whole.
117 A better approach is to look at the entire policy as well as the market need to which the insurance policy is responding. Armed with both the negotiated terms of the policy and the parties' primary purposes, courts can then resolve policy ambiguities that manifest the distinct expectations of the parties to the insurance agreement.
18
Ambiguities contrary to the intentions of the insureds should be resolved in favor of liability coverage. 119 Generally, however, judicial analyses fail to consider both the entirety of the D&O policy and its purpose in providing reasons for finding liability or indemnity coverage.
The fault, however, may not lie with the court, but with the insureds. Insureds continue to make the ipse dixit argument that D&O policies are customary liability policies because the titleregardless of the market uncertainty driving D&Os to seek liability insurance and the entire policy contents-labels the policy as a "liability" policy.' 20 Carriers correctly argue that their actual intention is to provide indemnity coverage.
12 1 Fortunately for the insureds making the ipse dixit argument, several courts have endorsed their reasoning (or lack thereof). 
Little v. MGIC
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1979) (stating contractual terms are to be interpreted in such a way that they are given a "reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning," over an "unreasonable, unlawful" or ineffective meaning). Certainly, the title of a policy-a "liability" policy-if merely a customary way of referring to such a policy is standardized language and courts should look more carefully at the contents of the policy.
118 See id. § 202(1) (stating that the primary purpose of the parties, if ascertainable, should be given great weight). Itis arguable that the "liability" title indicates the primary purpose of the parties is to create a liability policy. We begin by noting that, as its title plainly indicates, the policy is a liability policy rather than an indemnity policy .... The language of [the loss provision] is entirely consistent with the characterization of the policy as a liability policy. A "loss" is defined as an amount that the insured is "legally obligated to pay." Although this section does not explicitly speak to the timing of the insurer's duty to pay, the only reasonable interpretation is that this duty arises at the time the insured becomes "legally obligated to pay."
124
The court's reasoning is tautological. The court looks only to the title and the loss provisions of the policy. In order to find that to be the "only reasonable interpretation," the policy must be read as a liability policy in the first place. Because the policy is silent as to timing, the court should have looked elsewhere in the policy, and if that was not sufficient, to the purposes of the policy as a whole.
Treating a policy as a liability policy simply because of the name on the title page and a facile reading of the loss provision fails to consider the intentions of the parties to the agreement. Such an approach only manifests ajudicial preference for insurers to pay the costs of litigation as they are incurred, regardless of whether such an obligation is intended.
Furthermore, such an analysis is not a persuasive foundation on which to support future decisions. It is too easy for insurers to point at such decisions as gestures ofjudicial activism by the courts.
Judicially shifting cleanup costs to the insurer in such a cursory manner only shifts the potential absolute liability to the insurer without regard to whether that is the purpose of the agreement. Therefore, superficialjudicial construction of insurance agreements manifests an inequitable treatment of insureds and insurers, and places the highly correlated risk of environmental liability on the insurer. 125 This partiality for a perfunctory construction of the Circuit found the policy at issue ambiguous as to time of payment. The court reasoned that the policy was by default a liability policy (not indemnification) and thus provided coverage for losses that the insureds were legally obligated to pay as insurance agreement cannot be cured by better policy drafting, but only by the loss of insurance availability. Besides determining whether a D&O policy was meant to be a liability policy or an indemnification policy, courts must also determine whether the requirements for coverage 127 are met by CERCLA potential liability notice. Five requirements must be met to find D&O liability coverage. First, there must be loss and a legal obligation to pay. Second, there must be no indemnification by the corporation. Third, there must be a wrongful act actually committed or attempted, or allegedly committed or attempted before or during the policy period. Fourth, the claim must be made against the insured during the policy period (or some extended period).
28
And finally, the loss must not be the result of a claim arising from circumstances excluded under the insurance policy's exclusions. 129 proper insurance market operation, for independent individual risks). "Sodo-legal risks," such as the risk of the courts relaxing legal standards, are highly correlated and not independent. See id. at 1544; see also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 536 (1984) (noting that "socio-legal" risks may destroy the insurer's ability to predict loss distribution with accuracy). Therefore, presentjudicial interpretations of D&O insurance policies favoring liability coverage for insureds prevent insurers from realizing the comparative advantages of aggregating a class of independent risks. In determining whether an environmental liability requires coverage by a D&O liability policy, the first question is: has there been a loss under the terms of the policy. "Loss" is a term of art that is defined in the policy." 3 ' Typically, it is defined as "damag; es, judgments, settlements and Defense Costs ... incurred in the defense of actions, suits or proceedings and appeals therefrom;...
[l]oss shall not include civil or criminal fines or penalties imposed by law." 13 1 Losses deliberately caused by the insured are outside the concept of risk, implying that there must be some quality of uncertainty to the loss-generating event.
1 32
The second requirement, that there be no indemnification by the corporation, prevents double recovery by the insured D&Os and double payment by the insurer. Since all D&O liability policies contain corporate indemnification policies, double recovery would occur if the insurer reimbursed the corporation and provided liability coverage to the individual. The third requirement, that there be a "wrongful act" by the insured before or during the policy period, prevents an insured from claiming a loss for an act or alleged act that is done after the insured is no longer hovered by the agreement. Such a requirement limits the duration of the coverage.
The most important aspect of liability insurance is the extent of the losses that it covers. Liability insurance provides that in addition to liability for damages (for example, response costs), defense costs will be treated by courts as losses. MP2 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 21.07 (stating that losses are "distinctly different from the underlying 'Wrongful Acts' for which directors or officers may be liable"). Furthermore, it has been held that the insurer of a D&O liability policy is only liable for losses, and not for the underlying "wrongful acts" for which D&Os may be liable. See Gilliam, 735 F. Supp. at 352.
15" See Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that language stating that loss included "defense of legal actions, claims or proceedings and appeals therefrom," which the insured "directors are legally obligated to pay" supported a duty by the insurer to pay legal expenses as they were incurred); see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that "an insurance company is obligated to defend an insured whenever the complaint filed by the injured party may potentially come within the policy's coverage").
[Vol. 140:241 conditions of the policy is presumed. 1 3 4 Immediate defense costs include discovery costs in determining the identities of other PRPs who should be joined, environmental consultation to determine the most cost-effective cleanup plan for a site, and legal costs associated with negotiations with the EPA. There is a possibility that such costs may not be covered by statutory or contractual indemnity.
3 5
Liability coverage of defense costs relieves D&Os of a substantial financial burden not provided by indemnity insurance. Once an insurer's obligation to provide financial coverage is triggered by a claim made during the policy period and the loss is potentially covered by the policy agreement, the insurer has the obligation of paying defense costs as they are incurred. 
a. Inability of D&O Liability Insurance to Work as an Effective Market Tool Arising from Judicial Failure to Regard EPA Notification of Insureds as an Event Triggering Coverage
The fourth requirement, that a claim must be made against the insured during the policy period, is especially important in CEROLA claims. Whether a PRP notice of liability is a claim that triggers a loss is important because D&O liability insurance is "claims-made."
Claims-made policies require that a claim be made during the policy period. 1 37 To determine the effect of a PRP notice one must " See National Union Policy, supra note 111, Form 47353, d. 1, Coverage A & c. 9 (requiring the insurer to advance to each and every D&O the defense costs of claims prior to their final disposition and that such advance payments be repaid by the insureds, "severally according to their respective interests," in the event they are not entitled to the coverage under the terms and conditions of the policy). 136 See Chubb Policy, supra note 111, ds. 6.1-6.3 (requiring that consent to advancement of defense costs not be "unreasonably" withheld); see also Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although D&O liability policies generally require no duty to defend, the absence of a duty to defend is not crucial because D&O liability policies impose upon insurers a duty to pay defense expenses as incurred); Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 794-95 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that unless a duty to pay defense costs as they are incurred is explicitly negated by a D&O liability policy, the policy must be construed against the insurer as providing such a duty).
137 Under a claims-made insurance policy:
[T]he insurer agrees to assume liability for acts or omissions of the type covered by the policy regardless of when they occurred, if (1) the claim arising out of the act or omission was made during the policy period, or (2) notice was given to the insurer within the policy period as to an occurrence which may subsequently give rise to a claim.... This is compared to an occurrence policy, which covers acts or omissions occurring during the policy period regardless of when the subsequent claim is filed.
know that CERCLA requires mandatory responses for which the EPA, or any other responding party, recover its response costs.
13 8
The mandatory responses include short-term or "removal" costs for a spill or sudden leak and long-term or "remedial" costs in situations where the site requires a full-blown cleanup. PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 656 (1990) (explaining that the EPA's process of placing a site on the National Priority List, preparing an elaborate study of site conditions and cleanup options, and negotiatingwith the PRPs may take two or more years). Usually, the EPA will attempt to negotiate a consent decree under which the PRPs can carry out the removal or cleanup. such notice should, therefore, be regarded as a coverage-triggering event. 145 It is in the best interest of the PRP to negotiate a cost-effective consent decree with the EPA for two reasons: first, to trigger a claim under the claims-made policy (assuring the policy coverage is not lost before a claim is finally made), and second, to minimize the PRP's response costs.
146 Assuming the insurer ultimately will be liable for a portion of the final cost, an early consent decree would be preferred by the insurer for the same reasons. However, if the insurer can prevent the claim from being made during the duration of the policy-thus avoiding coverage under a claims-made policy altogether-the insurer will prefer to delay.
Considering the large costs potentially attributable to a single loss, possibly the most significant criterion of CERCLA liability coverage under a D&O liability policy is the requirement that the loss not be incurred as a result of circumstances covered under a policy's exclusions. Technically, there are a number of possibilities in a standard policy for a carrier to use to deny coverage for CERCLA liability. The foremost of these is the pollution exclusion; for a truly effective pollution exclusion-providing it does not contravene public policy-will exclude claims arising from civil, criminal, or private actions connected with seepage, pollution, or contamination. Such an exclusion will deny a director or officer the liability insurance protection of the D&O liability policy by preventing advancement of interim defense costs and consultation costs as well as the ultimate remedial damages. Superfund and Its Impact on the Insurance Industy, 41 CPCUJ. 172, 175 (1988) (stating that although CERCLA's National Contingency Plan requires that cost-effectiveness be considered by the EPA in conducting a cleanup, statutory emphasis on permanent solutions has overshadowed cost-effectiveness as a consideration).
b. Judicial Avoidance of Whether a D&O Liability Policy is a True Liability Policy Through Circumvention of the Pollution Exclusion
In the mid 1980s, insurers started adding significant exclusions to their policies for claims arising from contests for corporate control.
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During this same period, the effects of the 1980 Superfund legislation were also beginning to be realized by insurers as a number of financially responsible parties sought coverage under Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies.
The legal environment that developed out of CERCLA recovery actions-a combination of unforeseeable risk .See KATZMAN, supra note 104, at 10 (stating that chemicals which themselves maybe relatively harmless can combine with others in the environment and, through a chain of chemical reactions, become a hazardous chemical); D'Arcy & Herricks, supra note 18, at 74 (arguing that heterogeneous exposure units, indefinite damage losses, unknown time when loss occurred, inexact determinability of contributors to the loss, and moral hazard all combine to make hazardous waste actions a poor subject of risk analysis).
149 See KATZMAN, supra note 104, at 78-79 (discussing the uncertainty of insurers resulting from differences in common law liabilities among states and between statute and common law, the effect ofjoint and several liability, and judicial willingness to ignore pollution liability exclusions).
150 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY INSURANCE atv (1982) (finding that "[tihe major insurability problem under CERCLA has to do with the particular combination of liability and financial responsibility provisions which tend to render the liability exposure of the insurer too uncertain for traditional underwriting practices"). SeegenerallyJohnA. three exclusions in one, but with only the first requiring a finding of actual seepage, pollution, or contamination, is to preclude coverage in the last two cases without an actual showing of contamination or release. The result of such an interpretation would be that insureds would be denied defense coverage associated with the receipt of an EPA notification of intent to join individual officers or directors as PRPs. A second interpretation would combine the first criterion ("for seepage, pollution or contamination") with each of the three excluded events. It would provide an exclusion: (1) for liability for contamination or pollution release and based upon a violation of a statute, regulation, or ordinance; or (2) for liability for contamination or pollution release and arising from an enforcement action by a public entity; or (3) for liability for contamination or pollution release and arising from any claims alleging the same under common law trespass or nuisance theories. The effect of this interpretation would be to preclude D&O liability coverage only in those cases where it is proven that seepage, pollution, or contamination actually occurred as a result of the insured's actions. The result of such an interpretation would provide coverage of defense costs for an insured receiving a PRP notice.
Since insurance contracts are prepared by the insurer's experts, who are learned in the law of insurance, it is not unfair that the insurer "bear the burden of any resulting confusion." 15 6 Therefore ambiguities of insurance policies are to be "liberally construed in favor of [the insured] and strictly construed, whenever possible, against the insurer in order to afford the protection which the insured was endeavoring to secure when he applied for the insurance." 157 Accordingly, the second interpretation of a typical D&O liability policy pollution exclusion would be the most reasonable.
Thus, under the quoted policy, the advancement of defense contamination and that the CERCLA action is not based simply on strict, joint, and several liability claims of a public or private entity against one of many PRPs. In contrast, under another D&O policy, even though the pollution exclusion is significantly more inclusive than the exclusion just analyzed, 159 the Coverage Clause and a related Defense Costs Clause effectively provide defense costs until it is shown that the loss is excluded by the policy. 160 Such a policy would provide effectively the same protection in defending against personal CERCLA liability.
Pollution exclusions may also be found by courts to be contrary to public policy or to the primary purpose of D&O liability insurance. Under close comparison, the provisions of the D&O liability insurance policies' pollution exclusion clauses appear analogous to a regulatory agency exclusion. Courts are in disagreement as to whether such regulatory agency exclusions violate public policy or are contrary to the primary purpose of the insurance policy. 162 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, as contrary to the federal policy behind those agencies. 16 3 In FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 16 4 the district court found that regulatory agency exclusions do not violate public policy as a matter of law, but are unenforceable where they contravene a federal agency's ability to perform its statutory duty. 165 The regulatory agency aspects of a pollution exclusion would exclude claims arising from an enforcement action brought by the EPA, a federal regulatory agency. Certainly, denial of coverage for an EPA claim, where the policy would otherwise cover liability, can be interpreted to contravene the EPA's statutory duty to clean up hazardous waste sites. This would be contrary to the public policy of CERCLA as much as a comparable regulatory agency exclusion is in contravention of FIRREA.
166
Congress has announced its intention that the courts determine whether contractual terms agreed upon by insureds and insurers (specifically, exclusion provisions) contravene the public policy behind federal statutes. 167 The government's statutory duty as a conservator or receiver is arguably just as great in preserving the environment as in preserving the banking industry. Therefore, courts may find that pollution exclusions are contrary to the public policy behind the EPA's protection of the environment. Where the parties' intent to limit the coverage of the policy is manifest, and yet is disregarded by the courts a real possibility exists that insurers, unable to limit their exposure to CERCLA liability, will have no choice but to eliminate their increased exposure. At that point, the only market mechanism to protect D&Os will no longer exist. Failure of both public and private responses to individual CERCLA liability in those states where liability is not limited by statute will force D&Os to find some other way to protect themselves from unacceptable personal risk. As a result of the restrictions on or elimination of commercial insurers' coverage of such liabilities, a responsible corporation would react to potential liability by reserving funds in a liability trust, or by self-insuring through risk pools backed by reinsurers or by a captive insurer. Because the risk of hazardous waste is generally unforeseen, potential generators cannot be expected simply to "get out of the market" of pollution liability. 169 Therefore, the only alternative is for D&Os to "get out of the market" of personal liability and move their operations to a state providing more substantial statutory protection.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, the marketplace for environmental liabilities, plagued by the substantial uncertainty of hazardous waste cleanup liabilities, is much like the marketplace affected by products liability uncertainties. 170 As in the products liability market, corporations suffer from imperfect information regarding risks, instability of tort law doctrines, and unpredictable shifts in popular attitudes toward acceptable risks. 171 Unlike products liability markets, however, those who place a religious faith in insurance cannot gain more protection by getting more religion. 172 History has shown that liability insurers will not respond to the uncertainties of environmental law by increasing premium charges in the face of uncertain-169 In other areas of potential liability, it is possible for businesses simply to "get out of the market." See Siliciano, supra note 150, at 1851 n.108 (discussing withdrawal of drug and IUD manufacturers from the market when product liability became too great). will overinsure when faced with legal instability).
ties. Instead, they may attempt to withdraw from the marketplace of pollution liability coverage altogether.
173
One commentator has suggested that because industry "is in a better position to calculate its own risks than the insurers, industryowned mutual insurance pools might have a comparative advantage over traditional insurers." 174 The problem of unforeseen environmental effects of managerial decisions is not one that will be easily overcome. Indemnity provides little comfort to the executive faced with bearing the burden of personally litigating a CERCLA action which may extend for years with continuingjoinder of PRPs and negotiations with the EPA. Statutory limits on potential liability are not available in all states, and may be preempted by the public policy behind CERGLA in states where such statutes do exist. For the present, where CERCLA is found to be predominant, there is only risk-risk that no sector of the insurance marketplace willingly seeks to reduce through insurance coverage. This is a far cry from the situation in the nineteenth century when steam boilers were being developed for industrial purposes. 18 2 Where developing technology offered both the promise of economic return and the substantial risk of explosion, insurers assumed a leadership role by creating an incentive to have safety features in the testing of boiler models, by monitoring the insureds' premises, and by reducing rates for boilers having a lower probability of loss. 8 In that situation, however, the only risk-determinant was the physical danger of boiler explosion. In the CERCLA situation, there are not only the physical dangers of release and 179 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 180 Some considerations behind statutory liability limits also apply to public insurance protection: fairness, where the potential liability is excessive compared to the defendant's culpability; economic logic, where strict liability or liability for negligence might lead risk-averse management to adopt more conservative policies than are economically efficient; and insurance costs, where government agencies can monitor insureds and regulate premiums on grounds of equity and risk-creating contamination, but the moral hazard of risk-creating behavior, the risk of administrative agencies changing the standards of "contamination," and the uncertainty of judicial construction of liability statutes and insurance policies in light of the public policy expressed by such statutes.
In the midst of this environment of uncertainty, individual risk further exaggerates these effects.
Corporate managers must continue to operate their corporations as best as they can-charged with fiduciary duties toward the shareholders on the one hand, but vulnerable to individual liability on the other hand. 18 4 No legal standard of protection exists for those D&Os who by act or by chance find themselves personally associated with a Superfund site. 185 The concept of fiduciary duty of D&Os to shareholders can be broadened to apply to decisions affecting the environment as well. Insurance would then be sought only in those situations where the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to the government environment had been breached.
Liability insurance has potential to act as an alternative to government regulation by allowing insurers to force safer industrial practices.
1 8 6 As long as insurance is available, it will continue to be the salve of choice for courts to apply where there is individual liability for hazardous waste cleanup. A tremendous body of law has developed in the judicial interpretation of CGL policies, covering the liabilities of the corporation as a whole. In the situation where the fiduciary duty to the corporation nor the government has not been breached, individual D&Os may be covered by the corporation's CGL policy as "insured(s)." 1 8 7 Simply by including the 184 The high remedial costs of deaning up industrial waste sites in the United States constitute only a small fraction of industrial pollution prevention costs. See H. Smets, CompensationforExceptional Environmental Damage Caused by Industrial Activities, in INSURING AND MANAGING HAZARDOUS RISKS, supra note 8, at 105. The risk of more stringent operating controls, therefore, arguablyinfluences the decision-maker more than possible compensation of third parties. See id. at 106. 185 Ironically, this is true even though Congress has expressed a public policy to encourage insurance and indemnification. See CERCLA, § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988) (providing that "[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section").
186 See Baram, supra note 8, at 418. 1 8 7 A large volume of common law regarding the interpretation of CGL policies has been developed (favorable to corporations in all jurisdictions) which would reduce the risk associated with environmental decisions. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (noting cases discussing whether a PRP letter triggers CGL coverage); see also supra note 152 (providing source listing numerous cases regarding corporation's D&Os in the definition of the "insured(s)" in the CGL policy, an alternative to uncertain judicial construction of D&O liability policies and an additional potential source of coverage for personal liabilities will be available. In an insurance marketplace where fault-based liability relies on the outcome of causation findings, insurers will assume a leadership role by monitoring the activities and decisions of insureds (both corporations and individuals) to determine whether CGL policy coverage or D&O policy coverage applies. Moreover, insureds would have a real incentive to act with good faith and to use their best judgment in decisions involving hazardous waste in order to receive more certain coverage.
In the meantime, D&O liability insurers must take an active role in the litigation decisions of their insureds and in their negotiations with the EPA to ensure that a D&O liability policy is not being used to supplement a corporation's CGL policy. Insurers are likely to remain the primary source for environmental cleanup costs, no matter how explicit they attempt to make their desire to be relieved of the pollution liability burden. As one Justice Department official stated in justifying appropriation of insurers' funds to pay for Superfund cleanup costs:
"We were facing a $100 million shortfall in coverage of costs of cleaning up dioxin contamination ... and had exhausted other avenues of recovery.... We don't want to get in the middle of what is a conflict between one part of corporate America [(insurers)] and another [(insureds)], but if appropriate cases come up, and we have no place left to look for cleanup funding, we will do so again." 188 CGL policy's pollution exclusion clause). 
